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Abstract
Conditional cash transfer programs have emerged all across Latin America, Africa,
and Asia as an innovative approach to conventional forms of social assistance programs. This
thesis explores the effectiveness of the program through case studies on Brazil’s Bolsa
Família and Malawi’s Zomba Cash Transfer Program to examine whether the two programs
have long-term impacts to reduce intergenerational poverty. I conclude that, while CCT
programs are effective in meeting short-term objectives, further study must be conducted to
determine whether they affect the cycle of intergenerational poverty in the long run.
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Introduction
Social welfare programs have been constantly challenged and contested by scholars
and field workers. One key question they ask: what are the goals behind interventions and
can the efficacy be proved? Despite good will and good intentions, the motivations behind
social policy and social work can be biased and problematic, especially in poverty alleviation
programs. In fact, some programs have weak coverage, high administrative cost, and only
address short-term solutions. Therefore, some programs can cause more problems than there
once were. Additionally, administrators who imply that beneficiaries are not capable of
choosing what is in their best interest and assumes that only they know what is “good for
them” are harmful to the local community. Therefore, there is a paradox when stakeholders
from governments and organizations have motivations and intentions that are not in
alignment with the spirit and needs of the beneficiaries. The paradox is that governments and
organizations are trying to alleviate suffering through humanitarian action but there are
unintended negative consequences from the intervention that can cause the prolonging of
suffering that was intended to be alleviated (Terry, 1998). Experts may have great knowledge
and experience but the beneficiaries are the experts of their local communities.
Recognizing that there can be unintended negative consequences in social welfare
programs, there are two factors that should be considered when stakeholders consider
implementing social assistance programs: context and local capacity-building. The context is
essential for design and implementation because the analysis of the context will provide a
better understanding about the vulnerabilities and capacities of the recipients. Social,
political, and economic factors should be taken into account in the analysis so that programs
will be structured based on relevance and need. However, governments and organizations
cannot design and implement programs on their own. Even though governments and
organizations can study these factors, they lack local knowledge. If they work without
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including local actors, they will isolate themselves as the ‘other’. The role of the ‘other’ is
more vertical or a ‘top-down’ approach where governments and organizations with power
lead the narrative and decision-making processes. By bringing local experts to the table,
external stakeholders can support to create better outcomes and help build local capacity.
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs incorporate these notions of increasing
local capacity-building in assistance programs. CCTs are a type of safety net program that
transfer cash, typically to poor households, upon pre-defined requirements. The main
objective of these programs is to increase poor and vulnerable households’ income and invest
in the human capital of their children (“Cash Transfers”, 2016). Although there are many
studies on CCT programs, the impact it has on preventing intergenerational poverty has been
understudied. CCTs are popular because the programs are contextualized and recipientoriented, unlike donor-driven aid programs. This type of program gives dignity back to the
recipients because they can select how to use the money received, providing them with a
sense of ownership. In this thesis, I will examine the effectiveness of CCT programs through
a comparative analysis on Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Malawi’s Zomba Cash Transfer
Program (ZCTP) to interrupt intergenerational poverty. The growing use of cash transfers is
significantly driven by improvements in the design and implementation. The efficacy of
CCTs can be determined by analyzing the impacts on household and individual behavior in
relation to program aims (Das, Do, & Öz, 2005). Therefore, I will conduct a qualitative
analysis on the structure and design of the two cash transfer programs to determine whether
CCT programs are the most effective solution to ending intergenerational poverty in these
cases.
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Context: Investing in Human Development
The emphasis on human development has increased in the past few decades. In 1990,
the United Nations introduced its first Human Development Report which offered a new
approach for advancing human wellbeing. The human development approach is the idea that
we need to expand human capabilities by increasing freedom through opportunities and
widening choice (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). This means that the focus
was on developing people’s abilities and giving them opportunities to use their skills. The
approach also conceptualized the power of choice. Choice is not limited to economic growth–
it encourages people to lead lives that they value and to improve human conditions so that
they can lead full lives.
Scholars such as Amartya Sen and Paul Collier have contributed to the dialogue about
the need for investing in human development through aid and assistance. One of the
economists who helped form the modern concept of human development is Amartya Sen.
Sen’s Development as Freedom explains that processes allow freedom of actions and
decisions, and opportunities are essential for leading the type of lives that people value. He
considers poverty as a “deprivation of basic capabilities, rather than merely as low income”
(Sen, 1999, p. 20). Thus, he calls for capacity building to give back their freedoms and
suggests that a push of aid or assistance could lift the poor.
Collier also has similar views in needing to reach out to the needy, or as what Sen
describes as people suffering from unfreedom. He argues in The Bottom Billion that, although
aid has serious problems and limitations, aid and is “part of the solution rather than part of
the problem” (Collier, 2007, p. 123). Collier is in support of aid and assistance because the
intervention can speed up growth. He believes that countries of the bottom billion
cumulatively would have been poorer than they are today without aid, so aid has been a
“holding operation preventing things from falling apart” (Collier, 2007, p. 100). Still, he
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warns that aid alone is unlikely to address the problems of the bottom billion and it has
become too politicized to the point that the design has become dysfunctional.

Relief to Development Continuum
In this thesis, it is important to acknowledge the nexus between humanitarian and
development phases of response. The humanitarian sector primarily focuses on saving lives
and alleviating suffering. Therefore, humanitarian work has historically consisted of
emergency relief and disaster assistance. Its objective is to quickly respond to incidents in
disaster zones and other crises by providing short-term relief and addressing immediate
needs. The development sector centers its work on responding to ongoing structural issues,
such as systemic poverty, which hinder economic, institutional, and social development in
any given society. Development work often takes the form of long-term projects focused on
projects taking place in developing countries. Sustainability is essential to development
because the objective of these programs is to sustain their progress.
In recent years, development has become more popular because it seems more
glamorous than relief for some people. There are misconceptions that development work is
equivalent to doing good or combating poverty, which to many is a moral imperative. Does
this mean development will eventually replace humanitarian interventions? Is the
development sector more dependent than temporary work? These questions create a rift
between the sectors when, in reality, we need to bring these two together.
Today, there are efforts to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development in
order to allow governments and agencies to “move from emergency response towards
integrated disaster-preparation and sustainable development” (Brigaldino, 1996, p.367). Both
the humanitarian and development sectors are necessary and should coexist with each other.
The narrative of humanitarian versus development misses the point that there is a crucial link
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between relief and development. The ‘relief to development continuum’ model suggests that
relief should contribute to development. Brigaldino advises that there should be improvement
through incorporating recovery and rehabilitation processes. Additionally, he states that
flexibility in programming and funding is essential during the transition from relief to
development (Brigaldino, 1996). Most importantly, awareness and understanding of the
relationship between humanitarian and development is indispensable. In this thesis, I will
primarily focus on CCT programs conducted in the development phase of the continuum.

Paper Outline
This thesis will first explore the emergence of CCTs to better understand the shift
towards this type of social assistance program. In relation to the relief to development
continuum, I aim to address whether there are long-term effects of CCTs in ending
intergenerational poverty through analysis on targeting mechanisms, program purpose, and
short-term benefits of CCT programs. Finally, the thesis will present case studies on two
CCT programs: Bolsa Família and ZCTP. The evaluation will be conducted with the five
OECD/DAC evaluation criteria to conclude that, although conditional cash transfer programs
are one of the most viable forms of intervention in the short-run, the long-term sustainability
of Bolsa Família and ZCTP are uncertain.
Methodology
This research was designed based on my interest in the concept of giving dignity and
choice to people, which is included in the model of CCT programs. Since Bolsa Família is
one of the first CCT programs that emerged, I sought to compare the program with ZCTP for
my cross-region analysis to show that the CCT model can be used effectively across different
contexts. The thesis examines the history of CCT programs along with relevant scholarship
and case studies of two diverse CCT programs to answer the question on CCT programs’ role

8

in preventing intergenerational poverty. The sources in the literature review primarily derived
from books, academic and scholarly journals, newspaper articles, published reports, and
organizational websites.
Prior to this thesis, research on CCT programs have been conducted from both
qualitative and quantitative approaches. While I make use of quantitative methods to conduct
research, I do not talk about my own statistical analysis or research instruments. Due to my
academic background, I have taken a qualitative approach in my case study analysis.
Although experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations are powerful, they can be
impractical when the results do not reflect the context of specific CCT programs and do not
look into reasons why interventions did or did not work. Therefore, I will present theory- and
value-based approaches to evaluation in addition to addressing these flaws.
Review of the History of CCT Programs, and Overview of Relevant Scholarship
Rise of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
After the global financial crisis of 2008, the potential impact of the economic disaster
on living standards reaffirmed the importance of social safety net programs (Fiszbein et al.,
2009). In particular, there has been a rise of conditional cash transfers programs within the
last decade as shown in Figure 1. The first CCT programs, Progresa and Bolsa Família, were
started in Mexico and Brazil in the mid-1990’s by their respective governments. Mexico’s
Prospera program (previously called Progresa and Oportunidades), covers 6.1 million
households and Bolsa Família serves 14 million families (Scott & Hernández, 2017; Wetzel,
2013). A 2016 report documented that 63 countries have at least one CCT program– the
number of CCT programs initially increased by 2 countries in 1997 and 27 in 2008 (Bastagli
et al., 2016).
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Figure 1. CCT programs in the World, 1997 and 2008. Adapted from “Conditional Cash
Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty”, by A. Fiszbein et al., 2009, p. 32,
Copyright 2009 by The World Bank.

Cash transfers have become more prominent ways to improve assistance,
transforming the humanitarian system. CCT programs are a new approach to social
assistance, in that they seek to address addresses the shortcomings of traditional social
programs. These shortcomings include weak poverty targeting; high administrative or
component costs; lack of integration of disparate projects with a multiplicity of overlapping
or unrelated goals; accusations of paternalism and clientelism; and excessive focus on
reducing current poverty with little attention to long-term, structural poverty (Rawlings &
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Rubio, 2005). In this thesis, I claim that CCTs differ from traditional social assistance
programs in each of these respects.
CCT programs have most often been used to reduce poverty and assist households to
break out of a vicious cycle of extreme poverty. These programs have been adopted in
various countries because they are versatile and can vary in scope (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
They span a range of low- and middle- income countries, large and small programs, and take
place in regional and national levels. The roles of CCTs in social policy vary by program.
Each program is unique because of the specific contexts in which they operate, but in general,
CCTs seek to address both current and future poverty. CCTs can be used in the short run to
redistribute income and in the long run to build human capital of poor children (Fiszbein et
al., 2009). The focus on human capital development aims to break the cycle of poverty by
providing education and improving health and nutrition conditions. Whereas the income
support provides short-run consumption to tackle current poverty.
Besides the emphases on accumulating human capital and reducing long-term
poverty, CCT programs set themselves apart from other social assistance programs through
their design. The CCT model provides grants directly to beneficiaries, changing
accountability relationships among the national government, service providers, and the poor
(Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). This setup helps strengthen the relationship between service
providers and the poor, and the grants allow national governments to foster collective
responsibility.

Program Design & Context
CCT programs call for the same systems as other transfer programs. They need the
means to establish the eligibility of beneficiaries to enroll in the program, mechanisms to pay
benefits, and strong monitoring and evaluation systems (Fiszbein et al., 2009). It is essential
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to monitor compliance with conditions and coordinate among the several stakeholders
involved in operations of the program. When setting up a CCT program, the donor or
government agencies should document Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) with
stakeholders to identify the system, responsibilities, and critical actions for ensuring a timely
and quality CCT through the project cycle (“Working with markets and cash: Standard
operating procedures and guidance notes”, 2013). The SOPs ensure clarity between
departments and between field and headquarters staff. In addition, SOPs help agency staff to
maintain their accountability and monitor the minimum set of procedures and systems, which
can be adapted and expanded to ensure relevance to context and compliance to donor
priorities.
In the planning stages, governments and agencies need to decide on a targeting
method to select beneficiaries for the CCT program. They should conduct a vulnerability
assessment to set an eligibility criteria to determine which households are qualified to receive
aid. The criteria can vary between programs but CCTs often use household income, land
ownership, and employment as indicators to pool a select group of participants. There are
several types of targeting methods but the most commonly used forms are household
targeting, geographic targeting, and community-based targeting.
Household targeting is used by two thirds of countries and geographic targeting is
utilized by another two thirds (Fiszbein et al., 2009). Many countries use a combination of
household targeting and geographic targeting for their CCT programs. For example,
Mexico’s Prospera program used a marginality index, based on census data, to select eligible
communities in rural areas. Prospera targeted rural communities with a high marginality
index with more than 50 and fewer than 2,500 households (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). In
another example, Honduras’ Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) II, used malnutrition
data from the Height Census of First Grade School Children to select municipalities.
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Lastly, the use of community-based targeting increases transparency during the
process of designing the program. In this method, the community themselves conduct a
vetting process to list eligible households that should be recipients of aid. For example, field
workers can host a town hall meeting with community leaders where they can score and
verify low-income households that should receive the cash transfer. The community members
will have local knowledge about which households needs more assistance over another, and
their participation gives them dignity. CCT programs also induces self-selection so that
targeted groups participate in the program and others who do not need it can opt out. When
the benefits of the cash received exceed the cost of the condition (the utility loss from being
forced to consume a certain amount), poor households will self-select into the program (Das
et al., 2005).
It is vital to also consider the fact that the gender of the cash transfer recipients can
impact how transfer income is used. Cash transfers are more often given to women as studies
show that mothers’ objectives are more closely aligned with children, especially with
daughters. When mothers have greater control over resources, they tend to allocate more
resources to food and their children’s health and education (Thomas, 1990; Hoddinott &
Haddad, 1995; Schady & Rosero, 2008). Additionally, there are studies which indicate that
women are more responsible in using funds for stated purposes than men (Hoddinott &
Haddad, 1995). John Hoddinott and Lawrence Haddad (1995) suggest that men are more
likely to spend a greater proportion of their income on goods such as alcohol, cigarettes,
status consumer goods, and ‘female companionship’ from their research on African
households. On the other hand, Jessica Hagen-Zanker disagrees, stating that there are no
significant differences between male- and female-headed households (Hagen-Zanker et al.,
2017). Lastly, cash transfers to women can increase the bargaining power of women
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(Fiszbein et al., 2009). When women are given cash, the transfer income can encourage them
to reinforce their ability to shift household spending through new allocations.
Another aspect that stakeholders must decide on during the designing process is the
program size for CCT programs. Program size can largely differentiate based on coverage
and budget. As seen in Figure 2, programs with absolute coverage can range from 14 million
families in Bolsa Família to 215,000 households in Chile’s Solidario to pilot programs with a
few thousand families in Kenya and Nicaragua (Fiszbein et al., 2009). On the other hand,
programs with relative coverage can range from approximately 40 percent of the Ecuador’s
population in Bono de Desarrollo Humano to about 20 percent in Brazil and Mexico to 1
percent in Cambodia. The cost of CCT programs also alters depending on the program.
Previously, the budget has varied from roughly 0.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
in countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico to 0.08 percent of GDP in Chile (Fiszbein et
al., 2009).

Figure 2. Program size and conditions. Adapted from “Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing
Present and Future Poverty”, by A. Fiszbein, et al., 2009, p. 5, Copyright 2009 by The World
Bank.
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In both the registry and payment processes, coordination among actors is crucial
during the implementation stage of the program. Coordinating with local stakeholders to
select target areas and population helps avoid duplication with different programs and
effectively use aid. Communication with local government authorities, business owners, and
communities are essential to implement and monitor CCTs. Development programs are often
faced with unintended direct and indirect effects that are both positive and negative, however,
CCT programs will analyze those impacts beforehand.
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is inherent to CCT programs because
administrators need to know how the program is being implemented, or carried out, across
multiple actors and processes and measure for its strengths and shortcomings. Rawlings and
Rubio recall that:
The first generation of conditional cash transfer evaluations aimed at assessing
program impact and operational performance by examining the programs’
administrative adequacy, the extent to which programs reached poor areas and poor
households, the presence and size of expected impacts, any unanticipated effects,
stakeholders’ perceptions about the program, and the cost-effectiveness of delivery
mechanisms. (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005, p. 39)
CCT programs often use impact evaluations, which serves to measure changes in short- and
medium-term indicators of human capital accumulation instead of the income redistribution
effects (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). Programs focused on education look at indicators such as
school enrollment, attendance rates, and occasionally performance such as test scores.
Whereas programs centered around improving health and nutrition monitor health care
utilization and use quality indicators. Child health indicators often include “vaccination
coverage, malnutrition rates, incidence of diarrhea, and participation rates in child growth and
development monitoring” (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005, p. 39). CCT evaluations also include
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monitoring observable changes in consumption levels and tracking any patterns. During
M&E, if it is proven that households are are not complying to the conditionalities, families
could face sanctions such as a temporary reduction of transfer income. All CCT programs
have a schedule of sanctions but the degree of sanctions and enforcement vary between
programs.

Program Purpose
CCTs aim to promote social inclusion, make quantifiable impacts on poverty and
inequality, and foster economic authority (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2016). The most important
feature of CCTs is the conditionality of the program. With the specified conditionalities, this
type of program seeks to alter spending and behavioral patterns. Conditionalities can vary
greatly based on context but some common conditions are directed at education, health visits,
participation in workshops, and productive activities such as labor. Most cash transfer
programs monitor outcomes in the following themes: monetary poverty, education, health
and nutrition, savings, investment, and production, employment, and empowerment.
CCT programs have several advantages which include: giving back dignity to
beneficiaries, empowering families to make choices, reducing operational costs, and
improving M&E to receive feedback. Beneficiaries are given flexibility and freedom to spend
money on what they need. Therefore, these programs allow recipients to regain their sense of
control. In addition, since many CCTs give transfer income to women, this type of social
assistance program has helped women feel more empowered in the household because they
are included in decision-making of their household spending. Furthermore, CCT programs
are often chosen because they are cost efficient and can save transportation time of shipping
goods. According to the Department for International Development, CCTs are 18% cheaper
than in-kind transfers (ActionAid, n.d.). Instead, with the cash, beneficiaries can buy their
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preferred goods and channel money into their local markets. Lastly, M&E systems can help
governments and organizations to better understand and reevaluate people’s needs, existing
vulnerabilities, and their impact on local contexts and communities.
Scholars agree that CCT programs have often provided an “entry point to reforming
badly targeted subsidies and upgrading the quality of safety nets” (Fiszbein et al., 2009, p. 2).
Several studies have shown that CCT programs have overall been well targeted to poor
households, have raised consumption levels, and have reduced poverty. Rawlings and Rubio
state that:
With an emphasis on human capital accumulation and long-term poverty reduction,
conditional cash transfers are perhaps the clearest policy manifestation of this new
thinking on social assistance programs. Conditional cash transfer programs address
both future poverty, by fostering human capital accumulation among the young as
means of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and current poverty, by
providing income support for smoothing consumption in the short run. (Rawlings &
Rubio, 2005, p. 33)
Das, Do, and Özler argue that CCT programs have two purposes: restoring efficiency when
externalities exist and improving equity by targeting resources to poor households (Das et al.,
2005). CCTs can influence household behaviors by incentivizing child education and health
through conditionalities. Studies have shown that household decision makers hold misguided
beliefs about the nature of the process of investments in child education and health and the
subsequent returns to these investments (Fiszbein et al., 2009). There is evidence that the
change that comes with CCT programs can, in fact, increase combined welfare of the
household (Das et al., 2005). When families chose to participate in a CCT program, they
agree to abide by the conditionalities and choose to make “prespecified investments in the
human capital of their children” (Fiszbein et al., 2009, p. 1).
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Additionally, giving cash conditional on school attendance could encourage parents to
send their children to school when there is a conflict of interest between the mother and the
father as well as conflict between parents and the child. For example, a mother may be in
support of sending the child to school but a father believes that the child should put the need
to support the family over quality education. In another scenario, the child may want to go to
school but his or her parents do not send her to school because she will marry at a young age
instead. Education can increase combined welfare of all individuals in the long run so the
cash incentive allows households to also take long-term benefits into consideration.
Therefore, CCT programs seek to address the concerns from traditional social
assistance program by focusing on including the local community into every part of the
process, making cash more accessible and useful for recipients, and working on addressing
medium- and long-term impacts.

Benefits of Cash Incentives
Cash transfer programs can be categorized in two ways: conditional cash transfers and
unconditional cash transfers (UCTs). Both cash transfers are direct payments to people but
they have different implications. CCTs require beneficiaries to comply with specific
conditions to be eligible to receive cash. On the other hand, UCTs do not require
beneficiaries to take any specific actions so participants can simply receive cash by
qualifying for the program. In both types of programs, the beneficiaries can spend the cash as
they see fit. The advantage of UCTs is the ease and the simplicity for implementation, which
is not always the case for CCTs because conditions need to be verified before cash is given to
beneficiaries. However, CCTs promote behavior change to meet program objectives, instead
of recovery from emergencies and crisis. Each cash transfer program has to decide between
CCT and UCT during the design stage. There are various ways that are used to determine
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what is best for the context but one of the methods can be seen in Figure 3 below (Fiszbein et
al., 2009).

Figure 3. Program size and conditions. Adapted from “Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing
Present and Future Poverty”, by A. Fiszbein, et al., 2009, p. 167, Copyright 2009 by The
World Bank.

Standard economic theory assumes that people are rational and make logical decisions
that maximize utility. This is no different for poor people. Research has shown that cash is
more effective and efficient than grant services or particular goods such as food or housing
(Blattman & Niehaus, 2014; Kopf, 2016). Policymakers are frequently concerned with cash
transfers because they think cash would be abused or misdirected to alcohol, tobacco, or
other temptation goods. However, David Evans and Anna Popova have proved that cash
transfers actually reduce consumption in these areas. Their results have revealed that, on
average, cash transfers have a negative effect on total expenditures on temptation goods equal
to −0.18 standard deviations in CCTs and UCTs in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Evans
& Popova, 2017). Besides the income effect, CCTs can keep people away from temptation
goods because they bring about a substitution effect, generate “the flypaper effect”, and target
cash to women. First, CCTs can increase the value of schooling and good health so
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beneficiaries may substitute their spending on temptation goods for investments in education
and health. In addition, the flypaper effect can occur because cash is given for a specified
purpose. Research has shown that people are more likely to use resources if they have an
intended purpose (Evans & Popova, 2017). Furthermore, as stated before, women are more
inclined to use money on food and children’s health when they are in charge of household
income.
Therefore, CCT programs can increase consumption levels among the poor,
especially when the transfer has been generous, well targeted, and structured. Since the
programs provide a steady income, CCT programs have prevented poor households from the
worst effects of unemployment, fatal illness, and income shocks. Although CCT programs
have created positive outcomes, do these results last after the flow of income stops? There
have been mixed outcomes because meeting CCT program requirements do not always lead
to with having long-term impacts in the households. For example, school enrollment does not
directly cause academic achievement and determining a child’s height for their age does not
guarantee that the community has developed growth monitoring systems. Through the case
studies on Bolsa Família and ZCTP, I explore whether CCTs in these contexts have created
positive long-term impacts for beneficiaries.

Needing Complements
Das, Do, and Özler argue that CCT programs often meet their stated objectives,
however, there is tension between the efficiency and equity objectives. They state that the
effectiveness of the CCT program can only be determined by “how well [the program]
addresses market failures arising from mismatched preferences and how well it targets
resources to a particular group” (Das, et al., 2005, p. 61). Therefore, they suggest weighing
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the gains and losses associated with each objective to measure the overall impact of a
program.
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) are in also in support of CCTs because they have been an
effective way to redistribute income to the poor. Yet, they conclude that these programs
cannot fulfill all of the needs of a comprehensive social protection system, regardless of how
well-designed and well-managed the program may be. Fiszbein and Schady indicate that
CCT programs need other complementary interventions such as workfare, employment
programs and social pensions that allow the final outcomes to improve the quality of health
and education services (Fiszbein et al., 2009, p. 2). In addition, they advise CCT programs to
experiment with conditions that focus on outcomes instead of use of services alone.

Long-term Impacts and Intergenerational Poverty
Even though scholars and agencies have conducted research and case studies on
various occasions, the long-term impacts of CCTs have been understudied in this field of
study. Rawlings and Rubio state that further evaluation is necessary to discover whether CCT
programs are sustainable and can prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty. They
confess that, there is difficulty in identifying which element of the intervention, the transfer
or the conditions, is responsible for the observable changes in the evaluations (Rawlings &
Rubio, 2005). Therefore, evaluations fail to illustrate whether short-term successes of CCTs
translate into long-term impacts on human capital formation and poverty. Rawlings and
Rubio mention that CCT evaluations often do not present comparative evidence on whether
alternative interventions would have produced similar results (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005).
Despite limited evidence, case studies in Honduras and Mexico suggest that CCTs can
have long-term effects on educational attainment, geographic mobility, labor market
performance, and economic outcomes in early adulthood. Using the census data from
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Honduras’ five-year long CCT program, scholars presented the long-term effects 13 years
after the beginning of the program. Their research showed that early childhood exposure to
nutrition, health, and education components led to increases in human capital (Molina Millán,
Macours, Maluccio, & Tejerina, 2018). In addition, Honduras’ CCT program increased the
secondary school completion rate and the probability of reaching university by 50 percent.
Moreover, Molina Millán, Macours, Maluccio, and Tejerina add that the probability of
international migration of young men increased from 3 to 7 percent (Molina Millán et al.,
2018). In the case of Mexico’s Progresa, scholars predict that childhood exposure to the
program will improve school enrollment, geographic mobility, labor market participation
rates, and household economic outcomes such as total household labor income. For example,
according to their study, Progresa will increase schooling by 1.3 percent for both sexes and
labor market participation by 6 to 11 percent for women (Parker & Vogl, 2018). These
positive results can have lasting effects on the next generation’s education, work, earnings,
and household economic status, especially for women. As a result, these cases prove that well
targeted CCT programs have the potential to provide intergenerational benefits as large or
larger than current poverty effects ((Parker & Vogl, 2018, p. 28).
Case Studies

Bolsa Família
Since CCT programs can vary from one another, I will research and analyze two case
studies on Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Malawi’s Zomba Cash Transfer Program to determine
whether those specific studies have demonstrated that there are long-term impacts in the CCT
programs. Brazil endured a deep recession from mid-2014 to 2016 but the crisis has
continued for the Brazilian people. The national GDP contracted by 3.6 percent in 2016,
which indicates that the country’s economy was 8 percent smaller in 2017 than it was in
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December 2014 (“Brazil’s Recession Worst on Record”, 2017). According to the 2010
census, 11.25 million people live in slums, known as ‘favelas’, which is equivalent to 6
percent of Brazil’s population or roughly the population of Portugal (“Favela Life: Rio’s City
Within a City”, 2014).
In 2003, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva introduced Bolsa Família, which is a
government program that gives financial assistance to poor households on the condition that
they send their children to school and ensure the children are vaccinated. The program is
funded by less than 0.5 percent of the country’s GDP and its goal is to bring poor, vulnerable
families over the poverty line (Illingworth, 2017). The specific conditions for the education
component are that children from 6 to 15 years old must meet a minimum school attendance
of 85 percent and 75 percent for children between the ages of 16 to 17. In regard to their
health initiatives, the beneficiaries must go through nutrition monitoring if they are pregnant
and lactating women or have children up to 7 years old. Additionally, there are
conditionalities for prenatal and postnatal monitoring, and immunization schedules for
children up to 7 years old. Bolsa Família also supports the principle of shared responsibility
because there is an acknowledgement that there must be a two-sided commitment, or coresponsibility, from the state and the beneficiaries.
Bolsa Família provides cash transfers to 14 million households that earn less than
R$120, or US $68, per capita monthly with children up to seventeen years old and pregnant
women with up to three children (Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2010). The program also grants
monthly cash transfers to extremely poor households that earn less than R$60, which is
equivalent to roughly US $34, and do not enforce conditions to extremely poor households
without children. Payments are made on debit cards but recipients can also withdraw cash
from banks, ATM machines, and lottery sales points.

23

The program began in 2003 as a merger of four conditional and unconditional cash
transfer programs: Bolsa Escola, Fome Zero, Bolsa Alimentação, and Vale Gás. During
Lula’s first administration, he wanted to replace the three existing programs from the
Cardoso administration with one unified social program to increase coverage and eliminate
overlaps (Illingworth, 2017). Bolsa Escola, a cash grant for low-income families with schoolaged children between the ages of seven and fourteen aiming to increase education
attainment; Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and Bolsa Alimentação, two income grants focusing
on eradicating hunger and extreme poverty; and Vale Gás, a subsidy for poor families to
receive liquified petroleum gas to cook at home. When the transition occurred, the
beneficiaries of the past programs continued to be members of the Bolsa Família program.
Bolsa Família is different in comparison to other CCT programs because it uses selfdeclared income, has aspects of unconditional cash transfers, and is decentralized so
municipalities have to play a significant part in the program (Soares et al., 2010). Many CCT
programs select eligible households to target through proxy means tests (PMT) which helps
estimate the applicant’s household income or consumption using observable characteristics.
These proxy variables may include the location and quality of its home, ownership of durable
goods, demographic structure of the household, and education level and occupation of adults.
The PMT model includes more than a dozen variables and weighs them to predict the welfare
of the household. PMT helps CCT programs to only distribute social safety net benefits to
households that are poor enough to meet the specific income criteria. Bolsa Família,
however, did not use the PMT model and instead used means testing where applicants selfreported their income. As for the unconditional traits of the cash transfer program, as
previously mentioned, there are several benefits and challenges to both types of cash
transfers. Despite having an unconditional component, Bolsa Família has a great turnover of
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beneficiaries than in other CCT programs (Soares et al., 2010). Moreover, the program’s
implementation relies on local infrastructure for compliance and monitoring.
As shown in Figure 4, the percentage of people living on less than the national
poverty line has decreased from 24.7 percent in 2001 to 8.7 percent in 2015 (“Poverty &
Equity Data Portal: Brazil”, n.d.). Bolsa Família has contributed to this success since the
program has grown rapidly since 2003 and has provided for more than 50 million people
(“Bolsa Família: Changing the Lives of Millions, n.d.). As a country currently experiencing
high unemployment and social instability, will Bolsa Família be able to sustain its progress in
Brazil?

Figure 4. Poverty Trend (By National Standards): People Living Below National Poverty
Line. Adapted from “Poverty & Equity Data Portal: Brazil”, Copyright 2019 by World Bank.
Zomba Cash Transfer Program
As shown in Figure 5, the number of extremely poor people has continued to rise in
sub-Saharan Africa when it has decreased rapidly for other regions (Wadhwa, 2018). In 2015,
half of the people living in extreme poverty in the world were from countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. Malawi is classified as one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the United
Nations because it has not met the graduation threshold for all three criteria: gross national
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income (GNI) per capita, human assets, and economic vulnerability. Poverty is often
determined by a country’s GNI, and Malawi’s GNI per capita is just US$331 in 2018 (“Least
Developed Country Category: Malawi Profile”, n.d.). Due to climate-related shocks and
domestic political shocks, Malawi has encountered economic stagnation and a low pace of
poverty reduction. According to the World Bank, 9.3 million people lived under the national
poverty line and the poverty headcount ratio was reported at 51.5 percent in 2016, as seen in
Figure 6 (“Poverty & Equity Data Portal: Malawi”, n.d.). This data shows that over half of
Malawi’s population exists and lives below the poverty line.

Figure 5. People in Extreme Poverty (Millions). Adapted from “The Number of Extremely
Poor People Continues to Rise in Sub-Saharan Africa”, by D. Wadhwa, 2018, Copyright
2019 by World Bank.
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Figure 6. Poverty Trend (By National Standards): People Living Below National Poverty
Line. Adapted from “Poverty & Equity Data Portal: Malawi”, Copyright 2019 by World
Bank.
The Zomba Cash Transfer Program was started in Malawi’s Zomba district to
measure the impact of providing cash transfers to school girls so they stay in school, avoid
early marriage and pregnancy, and lessen the likelihood of getting sexually transmitted
infections. The Zomba district has high levels of poverty, low school enrollment, and high
HIV prevalence in comparison to the rest of the country. In 2017, the former capital city was
rated the third poorest district in Malawi (Kalimbuka-Mana, 2017). ZCTP was implemented
increase enrollment and attendance in the area. When the program launched in 2007, the
adolescent fertility rate was at 133 per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19 and pregnancy was the
main reason for dropping out of school and getting married at an early age (“Malawi: The
Zomba Cash Experiment - Does Paying Girls' School Fees Reduce Their Risk of HIV
Infection?”). In addition, the Zomba district has struggled with the slow spread of HIV
infection and other sexually transmittable infections. A 2007 study in the Zomba district
concluded that the prevalence of HIV infection among young women was 9.1 percent
compared to 2.1 percent in young men (“Malawi: The Zomba Cash Experiment - Does
Paying Girls' School Fees Reduce Their Risk of HIV Infection?”). Since education has been
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considered as a ‘social vaccine’ to prevent the spread of HIV, ZCTP wanted to examine the
potential impacts of CCT programs for schooling on sexual behavior.
ZCTP took place during 2008 and 2009 and it used a combination of CCT and UCT
programs. The programs provided conditional and unconditional cash for school-going girls
and recent dropouts over two years on a monthly basis. ZCTP specifically targeted girls who
were between the ages of 13 and 22 who are also unmarried. The amount of the transfer
varied between $1 and $5 per month for girls and dropouts, and between $4 and $10 per
month for their parents or guardians (Khan, Hazra, Kant, & Ali, 2016). Beneficiaries in the
CCT group received money if students were in school at least 80 percent of the time and
recipients in the UCT group received money without any requirements. The CCT component
also included coverage for secondary school, which was paid directly to schools. ZCTP
conducted a cluster randomized trial across 176 Enumeration Areas (EAs) in the Zomba
district to ensure that each parent received the same offer (Baird, Garfein, McIntosh, & Özler,
2012). The evaluation monitored 1,225 girls and their parents as part of the cash transfer
group and 2,571 girls in the control group (“Malawi: The Zomba Cash Experiment - Does
Paying Girls' School Fees Reduce Their Risk of HIV Infection?”). In this thesis, I will
observe the short-run results of ZCTP to evaluate if the objectives have had long-term
impacts in Zomba.
Analysis
To evaluate the CCT programs, I will use the five evaluation criteria from the
Development Assistance Committee of the Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD/DAC). The evaluation is an assessment to “determine the relevance and fulfillment
of objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability” (OECD,
1991, p. 4). The main purposes of evaluations are to instill accountability, including showing
transparency to the public, and to improve future aid policy, programs, and projects through
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feedback. The OECD/DAC criteria has shaped the way most donor agencies and their
grantees commission or design and conduct program evaluations (Chianca, 2008). The DAC
Network on Development Evaluation is currently consulting with stakeholders to revise the
criteria to adapt to today’s development landscape and the 2030 Agenda. The current criteria
are the following: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. In this
thesis, I will use the OECD/DAC evaluation guidelines to analyze if Bolsa Família and ZCTP
have proven that there can be long-term impacts from the program outcomes.
Relevance is the “extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies
of the target group, recipient and donor” (OECD, n.d.). In assessing the relevance of the CCT
programs in the case studies, I will consider if the objectives of the CCT programs are still
valid in the contexts. It is crucial to monitor whether the activities and outputs of the
programs remain consistent with the overall goal and attainment of each program’s
objectives. Within this criteria, it is important to also examine whether the activities and
outputs were consistent with intended impacts and effects. By investigating this, each
program can be evaluated on whether it can remain relevant in the long-run.
The second criteria, effectiveness, is defined as “a measure of the extent to which an
aid activity attains its objectives” (OECD, n.d.). This criteria helps determine whether the
objectives in the CCT programs were achieved or are likely to be achieved. It also gives an
opportunity to take note of the major factors that influence the success or failure to meet the
objectives. For the purpose of this thesis, I will also extend this criteria to ask if Bolsa
Família and ZCTP would be effective in ending intergenerational poverty. The third criteria
focuses on efficiency as a measurement of qualitative and quantitative outputs in relation to
inputs (OECD, n.d.). This term can be used in an economic sense to verify whether that the
aid uses the least costly resources possible to achieve the desired results. To guarantee that
the programs are the most cost-effective, programs should compare alternative approaches
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achieving the same outputs to determine if the existing program is most efficient. In addition,
the efficiency criteria also considers if the program was conducted in a timely manner.
Although a cost-efficient and timely program is necessary, the thesis will have an additional
focus on non-monetary to interpret program efficiency for Bolsa Família and ZCTP.
Impact, the fourth criteria, details if there are any “positive and negative changes
produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”
(OECD, n.d.). In relation to the CCT program case studies, I will analyze the main impacts
and effects resulting from the social, economic, environmental, and other development
indicators. The results can be data-oriented when figuring out how many people have been
affected, but it also some results are observational. In addition, external factors, such as
changes in financial conditions and natural disasters, can bring positive and negative impacts
that could not have been prevented.
The final criteria of the OECD/DAC evaluation guideline emphasizes sustainability,
which pertains to measuring whether the benefits of the programs are likely to continue after
donor funding has been withdrawn. It is necessary to design a program that is both
environmentally sustainable and financially stable. This step is crucial for all CCT programs
because they need to be able to sustain their results in years to come. I will identify if there
are any factors in Bolsa Família and ZCTP that are targeted towards ending intergenerational
poverty and if so, how likely the results extend to the next generation.

Bolsa Família
Relevance
Although Bolsa Família is a federal program, it relies on the work of Brazil’s 5,564
municipalities (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & De la Brière, 2007). The municipalities are mainly
responsible for maintaining a local coordinator, registering potential beneficiaries, and
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monitoring health and education conditionalities. Even though decentralization presents its
challenges in the implementation of the CCT program, it is also an opportunity to be
innovative in delivering service that caters to the local community. When Bolsa Família
works with local programs, it can link beneficiaries to complementary services, such as jobrelated services or training, to further empower them to be dependent and “graduate” from
social assistance programs (Lindert et al., 2007).
In addition, Bolsa Família is relevant to its context because the program prioritizes
vulnerable groups, such as indigenous families and former slaves. The program considers the
following groups to be a priority: quilombola families (descendants of Afro-Brazilian slaves
who escaped from slave plantations), indigenous families, families living on the street,
families living off recycling, families in which there is child labor, and families who have
been liberated from circumstances that are comparable to slave labor (Gazola Hellmann,
2015). These families must qualify for eligibility based on income, similar to other
applicants, but they can also self-identify themselves as a member of these groups during the
registration process so they receive benefits even in the case that the estimated number of
beneficiaries within the municipality has been reached.
Effectiveness
CCT programs are often deemed effective in reducing poverty, particularly extreme
poverty. Bolsa Família uses geographic targeting and household assessment based on per
capita incomes. Geographic targeting is implemented at both federal and municipal levels and
household eligibility is decided centrally by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight
Against Hunger (MDS) depending on household registry data collected locally (Lindert et al.,
2007). As seen in Figure 7, there is an uneven geographical distribution of poverty with
poverty massively concentrated in the Northern regions, especially in the northeast (Soares,
De Souza, Silva, & Gaiger Silveira, 2015). Therefore, the program naturally concentrates on
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those regions because it is where the poor are. Some studies show that the program works
better in poor regions than in affluent municipalities (Illingworth, 2017). Although Bolsa
Família has a high inclusion error, the program seeks to expand its coverage to include all
poor households and yet, the concentration index shows that the program performs best in
comparison to CCT programs in the same region (Soares et al., 2010).

Figure 7. Extreme poverty rates among agricultural households. Adapted from “Poverty in
Rural Brazil: It Is All About Assets”, by S. Soares, et al., 2015, Copyright 2010 by
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.

Efficiency
Upon the reform to unify the four programs into Bolsa Família, the Brazilian
government wanted to increase efficiency in the use of public resources. The program
distributed payments to beneficiaries’ electronic benefit cards on a monthly basis, cutting
middlemen in the process. Bolsa Família ensure that beneficiaries have easy access to cash by
offering 32,000 points to withdraw benefits (Lindert et al., 2007). This system eased the
process to mobilize cash while helping to promote dignity and connecting beneficiaries to
banking system. In addition, women are the legally responsible beneficiary in Bolsa Família
by Brazilian law and thus, household spending under a woman’s control is more efficient
than if a man were in charge (Lindert et al., 2007).
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Impact
Bolsa Família has had positive impacts on education and labor participation. There is
statistical evidence that has been an increase in school attendance and a decrease in the
probability of absences. The probability was 3.6 percent lower for children in the program
than children who are not participating in Bolsa Família (Soares et al., 2010). Moreover,
dropout rates have also decreased for children in the program. The probability of children
dropping out was 1.6 percent less than children in non-treated households (Soares et al.,
2010. However, studies have also shown that Bolsa Família does not have an impact on longterm objectives to keep children in school. Children in the Bolsa Família program are 4
percent more likely to fail to advance in school than non-treated children (Soares et al., 2010,
p.182). It may be the case that children living in poverty have chosen not to attend secondary
school because there is no incentive to attend.
On the contrary to the successes in the education objectives, Bolsa Família has thus
far failed to meet its health objectives. Despite having conditionalities, the Centro de
Desenvolvimento e Planejamento Regional (CEDEPLAR) evaluation found that Bolsa
Família had no impact on child immunizations (Soares et al., 2010). Since Bolsa Família
increased awareness about the need to access public health services and encouraged children
to get their vaccinations, there may have been difficulties with supplying these services.
Moreover, poor households still lack access to health service. A nationally and regionally
representative sample survey, Avaliação de Impacto do Bolsa Família, reveals that 23 to 25
percent of poor children failed to show their vaccination cards (Soares et al., 2010). This
implies that the children probably did not attend health centers at all. Therefore, low level of
monitoring of health conditionalities, lack of health infrastructure and services in
municipalities, and lack of coordination at the local level have created negatively impacts in
the healthcare objectives for Bolsa Família.
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Sustainability
As an ongoing program, it cannot be said with certainty that the success of Bolsa
Família will or will not continue after the program ends. However, there are three major
reasons to be skeptical about the sustainability of the program. First, the conditions on
education is not structured to make long-lasting impacts. Bolsa Família adopted the
conditionalities from the Bolsa Escola program so it kept the conditions of requiring primary
education for school-aged children between 6 to 15 years old. Since enrollment for primary
education is already high, Bolsa Família lacks a sustainable model for children’s education
beyond 15 years old. In addition, even though free public healthcare is a right in the Brazilian
constitution, the lack of health infrastructure, specifically M&E systems, affects the ability to
sustain positive results from a social assistance program such as Bolsa Família. Furthermore,
the economic condition and the political climate in Brazil have shifted since Lula’s first term
as president so Bolsa Família may not continue to be feasible and be a priority for the
government during crisis. The right-wing movement has increased in recent years and in
December 2018, a far-right populist was elected to be the new president beginning January
2019. Thus, there is a small possibility that the government can reduce costs going towards
Bolsa Família.

Zomba Cash Transfer Program
Relevance
Despite significant reduction in new HIV infections and AIDS related deaths,
Malawi’s HIV epidemic still affects adolescent girls and young women, especially in urban
areas. Therefore, the National Statistics Office of Malawi arranged EAs by distance to nearest
townships or trading centers to increase coverage. The 176 EAs consist of 29 EAs in Zomba
town, 8 trading centers in Zomba rural, defined as 111 population areas within 16 kilometers

34

of Zomba town, and 28 EAs more than 16 kilometers from Zomba town (Baird, Chirwa,
McIntosh, & Özler, 2010). In addition, ZCTP sought to investigate the relationship between
education and HIV through a CCT model. The positive intended impacts in the education
objectives show that the program remained relevant to the program goal to increase school
enrollment and decrease HIV infections among girls.
Effectiveness
Between the UCT intervention and CCT intervention, the CCT arm was more
effective than the UCT arm of the program. Sarah Baird, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler’s
evaluation at the end of the two-year program determines that, CCT recipients outperformed
UCT recipients in objectives focused on education. For example, even though there was a
decline in the dropout rate among the UCT group in comparison to the control group, the
result in the UCT program was only 43 percent as large of an impact as that in the CCT
program (Baird, McIntosh, & Özler, 2011). Beneficiaries in the CCT program had higher
attendance rates and more improvement in academics in comparison to UCT recipients. Thus,
it is evident that the conditionality plays a crucial role in the overall impact of CCT programs.
Efficiency
Monthly cash payments were structured to be accessible and efficient for
beneficiaries. Cash transfer points were centrally located and well-known places such as
churches and schools. Recipients were also assigned cash transfer points so that they do not
have to travel more than 5 kilometers to reach a cash payment point (Baird et al., 2010). At
each meeting, administrators collected basic information on who is picking up the cash and
how far they had to travel. Administrators also ensured that the program was being the most
efficient by having three groups, unconditional transfer, conditional transfer, and control
group, to measure and compare results across alternatives.
Impact
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ZCTP created positive intended impacts in promoting education and decreasing HIV
prevalence. The program reduced the probability of school-aged girls getting married by 40
percent and the probability of becoming pregnant by 30 percent (Baird et al., 2010). These
findings suggest that financially empowering school girls and their families have substantial
effects on their sexual and reproductive health. In addition, girls in both conditional and
unconditional cash transfer groups were less likely to drop out of school than the control
group. Even if girls dropped out at the baseline study, they had a greater likelihood to return
to school in comparison to children in the control group.
The evaluation also revealed that the incidence of onset of sexual activity was 38
percent lower among program beneficiaries than the control group (Baird et al., 2010).
Whether conditional or unconditional, the prevalence of HIV and Herpes Simplex Virus
(HSV-2) infection decreased 18 months after the program by 64 percent and 78 percent
(“Malawi: The Zomba Cash Experiment - Does Paying Girls' School Fees Reduce Their Risk
of HIV Infection?”). However, compared to the follow-up one year after ZCTP, the
evaluation after two years reported that the program had little or no impact on childbearing in
the CCT program while there the likelihood of pregnancy decreased by 6.7 percent in the
UCT program (Khan et al., 2016). This result may have been due to the fact that the UCT
program had a greater impact among girls who dropped out of school.
Sustainability
The role of HIV prevention in CCT programs has been understudied, specifically in
the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Even though ZCTP is one of the first CCT programs to
evaluate effect of CCTs on HIV incidence, the intervention aimed to address the short-term
issues but also extend its prospect of school girls in the form of human capital formation,
marriage, and childbearing (Baird et al., 2011). Özler’s research reveals that the UCT
component of the program failed to translate into increased welfare in the long-run. The
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decrease in teen marriages, total live births, and HIV infections and improvements in
psychological wellbeing and nutritional intake were no longer visible two years after the end
of ZCTP (Özler, 2018). In fact, as shown in Figure 8, there was a baby boom and a trend of
shotgun marriages among beneficiaries at the end of ZCTP. Beneficiaries reported lower
levels of empowerment and had husbands with lower cognitive ability compared to the CCT
and control groups (Özler, 2018).

Figure 8. Baby Boom and Shotgun Marriages After the Program. Adapted from “Do Cash
Transfers Have Sustained Effects on Human Capital Accumulation”, by B. Özler, 2017,
Copyright 2019 by World Bank.

On the other hand, CCTs sustained its progress on school attainment, incidence of marriage,
prevalence of pregnancy. However, we have yet to determine the long-term gains of
outcomes such as individual earnings, per capita, household consumption, subjective wellbeing, health, or empowerment in the CCT group (Özler, 2018).
Conclusion
Conditional cash transfers are well known for using effective targeting methods,
emphasizing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and bringing beneficiaries to the
forefront of the program. CCT programs have emerged as a new type of social assistance
program because of their innovative design and implementation methods to reduce poverty.
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However, the long-term impacts of CCTs to interrupt the intergenerational cycle of poverty is
often uncertain for several reasons. Most notably, they are understudied in the humanitarian
community because the focus of CCT programs initially lies only within the scope of shortterm impacts. Even though CCT programs have shown success in reducing poverty, studies
have yet to determine if poverty reduction trends can be sustained into the future, through
multiple generations. In order to maintain this progress, there must be high and sustained
economic growth as well as effective social policies. In addition, unintended external factors
can influence the sustainability of CCT programs. For example, unstable political
environments and natural disasters have put Bolsa Família at a place of uncertainty.
Additionally, the unexpected baby boom among beneficiaries has hindered the successes
once made in ZCTP, a type of CCT program. Despite these setbacks, CCT programs still
have the potential to make an impact on cycle of intergenerational poverty. Therefore, CCT
programs should first include indicators that pertain more to long-term impacts in the design
stage, then increase monitoring systems after program completion in order to determine
whether programs have sustained results for the years to come.
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